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CEaPTEE I 
Introductory 
There is no limit to the range of man's intellect. Ee can 
t!':linl-::: of what is possible and what is impossible with equal 
facility. Ee can buildup whole s·yster.J.s of thought on either of 
t.hese; and, by a mysterious dispensation of r'rovidence, he can 
oelieve and act upon the impossible. No other explanation will 
account for tte phenonenon wLere man denies the deepest truths 
of his beinc, unless .• e realize tL.a.t r.is mind is "capacious of 
all things." So it is with immo:r·tality. Historians tell us that 
of all the truths which are the conuJon possession of every peo-
ple, two especiaily are most widespread and deeply rooted in 
t~e hearts of men: ~There i3 a God ~ho is the Gupr~me Lord of 
creatioil;" and "Therf:l is an endless life after deatr., wher'e the 
good are re·aarded a.::1d tLe wicked punished. 11 ..:i.nd :vet, men have 
dared to deny both of these trutbs. The SU~JStance of u~e study 
'.vLich follovJs will oe to presuppose tbe first of these and to 
prove the second. Our pr'oof will be more than an at tempt to 
show how reasonable it is to believe in man's irrn;1ortalit:y; it 
will be a convinc·Lng demon~tration from reason that we must 
admit a l:Lfe after dea t}1 if we are to retain confidence in the 
:first principle::; of human J..~nowleu;,;e. 
2. 
Cll:.i.P'l'ER II 
His tory Of The Problem Cf Ir:11nor tali ty 
':Je might go througb tLe ·:vhole his tory of philosophic 
thout,J; t, from ':;:'Lalo:::; dovm to our m'!n clay, and review wl~.u t the 
out~'tandin s 1;eeula:::ors .Ln eae: ... cent~AJ.·;y belcl and tu't.'f:ht on the 
question of l."!:l.n 1 s futLAre life. 3ut tbat would be too deta5.led 
for Ol.U' pre3ent ~)urpoce. Our s tu.dy of' the problem is itself a 
speculative treatise. 'Dy way of historical intr·oduction, we 
shall Otl satisfied with quoting and conirnentines on a few re-
presentative men who bave dealt with our problem at d:U'ferent 
stat,:es in the progr·ess of human th.::n::.ght. 
J:;lato is the first of these. Eis writing:::; are filled with 
proved and unproved statements on tLe reality of man's im1H0r-
ta:ity. At times he seems to waver betwe3n conviction and 
belief, :mt even then we ma;r interpret his ninrl in favol" of 
conviction on the strength of otber passae::es in r~.is workn. rt 
typical instance of his wavering attitude occu1'S during Socra-
tes' clo:::in[: S;:>eech t:'J the jury. Hothinr: moved by the sentence 
o;· death, the c ond0ra::1a ticm ae tually eneourage :1 him to vent l'is 
mind on the insignificance ::;;f dea tl: and the hope of an e terrHll 
life. 
17il:at would not a man t;ive, o Jud£:::es, to speak with 
the gre~=tt learJer of the Trojan expedition, or Odysseus, 
or Sisyphus, or numberless oti:.ers':' '."!hat infinite delight 
in convarsing with thew and asking them questions. :n 
another world the~ do not put a man to death for asking 
questions. i'or, oesides 'Jeinc happiel" t:1e.n we are, they 
will be iru;ortal, if what iu said is true. 1 1 
2is rucord of a conversatioh between ~aerates and son~ 
il. then~_e.n friends in the dialogue l)haec~o clear l:y shows how 
certain Plato must have been ti-at irrn::ortality ls proveable to 
reason. 
'Socrates: '.7hen death attacks s. man, the mortal portion 
of him may be said to die, but the inuaortal retires at 
t!le arpro~tcb of rJea th anrJ is preserved safe and sound. 
Ceoes: 'l:'rue. 
:::ocrates: Then, ·:::oocs, 'oeyo'1.d question, the soul is 1m-
nor tal and ir"perishable, and our souls vlill truly exist 
in anotter world. 
3. 
Ceues: Iam convinced, Socrates, and have no further ob-
jections to mak&. 
,Simr:lias: I hrwe nothing more to say ei t:1er; nor can I 
see any re2.son for doubtine:; alJout the matter after what 
has been said. Still, I CE'.rhtot hel) feeling a bit un-
certair:. when I thi.nk of 'he greatness of the subject and 
the feenleness of man. 
r~0Cr·a tes: ~:es' Si:mr.:l.ias' that is we 11 s&id; anr:l :r may add 
that first principles, even when the~ appear certain, 
should be ~e.rofully considered. '.::·hen, wLen tbey are 
sa tis:c'ac toril;! a3certained, yov rna;y follov,r tl~.e course of 
t:-,e arcmnent with a SOl" t of hesitating con:c'icionce in 
huraan r·e a son. Eowever, once the argument is perfectly 
clear, ti1ere wi:;tl be no need for any further inquiry.'~ 
Perhaps Aristotle was too intent on man's present life 
to give much attention to whe.t becomes of his soul after ueath. 
:he r:hiloaopher 1 s reali::n:l is in ::;tr,lr:.ge contrast to the ideal-
i~n of :21a to. It is no wonrler, then, that .t..r•is to tlc 3houlr1 
confine e.lrnos t his entire study of the idea]_ part of man, his 
rational sonl, to the lirrlits of an ear·thly exj .. stonce. Iris rt.J-
ferences even to the possioility of a life after death are 
ments on tLe separate existence of tr"e human intellect, all of 
'."r~~1id• allow of cor:>tradictory interpretation. 
'Je have a good example of .. ;.ristotle 1 s uncertaint:;r in t·uo 
apart from each other but very difficult to reconcile. 
In the t!1.lrd book, he is discussine tbe p:t,~)blem of "choice-
maki_ngrt and elimina tine, one by one, the claims that choice is 
appetite, anger, wish, or a kind of opinion. After dismissinc 
the first two, he continues: 
1 J3ut neither is it wish, though it seems to be nenr 
it; for choice cannot be related to impossibles, and if 
anyone said that he chose them, he would be foolish; but 
th.ere may be & wish for imponsii)les, as for immortality. 1 3 
'?hen, in the tenth book, he is describin~:s the nature of 
happiness and showing how true happiness must co1:.sist in a 
life of contenljlu tion. Ee leaves no roCJm for any doubt here. 
1 I:C the attributes of intellectual activitv are found 
t·~ be self-suff'ic:iency, leisureline3s, and such freedom 
from I·atigue as is possiole for ~an, and all tbe otl-:..eP 
attributes of olessednes:-~; it f,1llow::: that it is tl-:..e ac-
tivity of the intellect whicb constitutes complete human 
hapj)iness - providecl it be granted a complete span of 
life, I' or no thi nt~: that be longc to ha pnine s s can be inc om-
plete. 
:uch a life as this, Lowe,rer, \7ill be higher ttan 
the hwnan level: not invirtue of Lis h~nanit~ will a man 
achieve it, \!ut in virtue of somethinc; within hir:r,ns it 
were, divine. ~:.nd o~r as mucll as this some thine i.::; ouperior 
to 11is compooite nature, b:I so much is its activity 
superior to the exercise of other forms of virtue. If, 
then, the i.ntellect; in ;;.;omethin~~ dJvine in compar:ison 
o. 
vJ'ith man, so is the life of the intelJ..ect divine -~)y 
comparison with his hLunan life. :i~or ou~~ht we to obey 
those who enjoin that n man should have man's thouchts, 
and a mortal the thouphts of mortality; but we ought, 
as far as possible, achieve imnortality and do all that 
man may to lj_ve in accord 'Nitr tl~e hip:hest tbJng wit;hj_n 
him; for, though this be small in bulk, in power and 
vali'.f) it surpasses· all ti.1e rest. 1 4 
Tbe coming o.C OlU' :Gord di v:. do s ti"ie li ve3 of the pagan 
and the Cbri s tian Plato almost to a yen.r. ?la to was oorn 42? 
years before Cr .•ris t; St. AUC'llS tine died Just 430 years after 
Christ. Anu if we were looking for sor.1e doc trine of philo-
sophy to epitomize the differences between Paganism and 
Christianity, we could hal"dly find a better instance than the 
r:logma of immortality. St. ) .. ugustine adva,lces man;y u.:::.".::_;DJ't10!1ts, 
:.~·ounded on reason, to 1n·ove that man's soul is indestruct-
i ble. ·~·-~;o complete treatises on the !1mi1or tali ty and the 
'<-,:.uanti ty oz t!-te ::oul, are ca talO[J'Ues of su.cL argur1entn. ::::ow-
ever, wLe~ he comes to rationalize on these reaGonings, we 
are permitted to read Yvhat soo~s to be h:;_::; tr-ue mind on the 
question. 
vne book ,·)efoN~ the end of his long thy tractate on the 
happiness. Ire fir!::t points out how irconceiveable i:> real 
happiness without the element of permanence. Then he makes 
an important observation on the possioilit-;y- of a natural 
proof for in:::--_ortali ty. 
1
.All tho no vvlio already are e>r who s i ~1cerel:y desire 
to oo happy, cannot help wishinc: to be ircr1ortal. ~"..man 
certainly not leading a happy life if he is deprived 
what he want8; c.::>rj,sequently, no life can oe tr•uly or· 
G. 
beatific unleos it is everlasting. 
It is no smell p•oblem,. thoug;h, to decide wLe ther 
human nature alone arr•i ve at the knowledge of \lrha t it 
spont<:lr;.e::lusly concodes i3 ueGil"'a~le. 0nc~J :cai th enters 
in, that. ?ai th which io in tr~oae to whor.1 Jesus· ha.:J ,e::;i-
vea to bec;)me the sons of (-'od, then no fur·ther qt::.estion 
is possi')le. Granted ttat many lJGD.etrt~tlne; thinkers 
have t::."'ied, t!:J.l•::rugb yeu:rs of car•::ful speculation~ to 
:-::.l7o tbe pr'Jhle:m of hu.man ir:r.lO:;:'tali ty iJy 1J.rhuments 
(ira·N:l ~·ro.:::i reason, a:1:l J:~1a t tl:o~r ~uere able to conclutle 
to the immortality cf th8 sot::.l alone, still, th.ey never 
proved that this life of happiness in stable and there-
fore truly beatifyinb• TLeir reasonings led them to Sf;...J 
the. t the ''l cru.l re t1,; . .1:t.:.~ to thtJ J:li ~er :tes of thi3 life af Lor 
attaining l.Jeatitude • .i.;ut 3ven thooe who knev1 better and 
believed t~at the 80-..:l :.ee;dainc, cleansed t:mcl bodiless, 
in endless happiness_, yet had suer ... unroaso~-:able ideas 
about tb.e ete.cnity of the worl-:~. tl<>.t ~he;; eq"t;.ivaler ... tly 
~c~icd their ori~inul ~octrine a~out the s~ul. 
C1.:r ::-'aith, on tJ:;:c otLe:r l:and, p:ccuic.;o3 11::.: tLut !}Je 
',i;:tolG lJW.n, "uoriy and .. scul, w~.ll Lo immortal anc1. ::::c, tr-..~.ly 
: ..La_ppy. It ~-·~ & p.2:~1~i~o ·:Jh.icr. docs 11.ct ~r·nst on ti·~Lo l~oa­
son~.;:~.::;s o:' r.1en out on t!:e a.uthor:tt;y of Cod. 1 G 
or irr ..r;:ortality must have cloc.::::-·ed itself of a c;ro;;...t 1 .. un;y-
:-;oul incou.·t::.ptible?l! ::o gives no less than el·3·;rt:m argu1aonts 
Ge11tilo~. ~orne of 
he interpr•<'.Jts the fhilosopher's words on tl:e possibilit~· of 
cu:ctuin .L'onns continuing to c:xis t a.ftor t~·;:; clissolut:tun of 
'i~r1.ctotle 1 ~ wol'dS clcar.i:y :JilOW tht:t, altt.ougb. l::e 
called the scnl a form., yo t, :,;,o u:~ver c.;laimed th;J. t it 
was nat sub::::istent and consequentl~ corrup~ible. 
Aristotle e:xcluded the :!.nt;c:lligent ::;oul from the 
e:,er~erali t:r of terms, calling it a special k:!.n<i of cuo-
:: tar:ee ui~ict c 0:1 ti nue:::; e.xis tir ... g a.fl~or· se pti:ca. t5. vt:.. .fJ•o:rr. the 
uol!.y. 1 6 
co.scu on the arg:..urH3Lts of' St. '.::houao. It is sufficient, tLere-
r· ore, to indicate here onl;y how !"lli'C he 'Nu~ of the quos Lion on. 
Nltional grounJ:::. Later· oa, we :::Lall see bovv far he went to 
7. 
pr·ove r:..o t only the possj_Oili ty out tLo fact of an c ternb.l lift;. 
~l.nd now, just before enter·i n~; on the inquir-y i t;::elf, we 
can profitabl9 read a few linen from ~r. Suarez to realize hov 
ccnvincerJ .Sctola"ltic philosophers ba':!'G bocom0, ::-~.nee ;'t. ':'ho-
mo.l'!' cla:T, on t:::.o doctrir>.e o:: man's iii:tulOl tc::..li ty. 
'I c1c;1y tho a8GUJ~pt"'.c:: t~:::;.L; ;;u ~u.·.,ro no ccr·trd.n pr.J0f for 
ot,.;,r in~.~01· tali t-y. ." .. nil ro.ora thar_ thu t, there are man-y and. 
convincing proofr: whicl-:. cr.: taLllsL. irrl!l"02.' tc..Jj_ ty. Some of 
them, .vhtc~: s~"'01.".' that tLe ::.Hml is in;ma teri&.l and ther~efore 
j_rll.l!Ol""tal, ar·e taker: :':;:om tl-:-<; o1-:J:;:·b.t~0•1::: of' th; .spcculattvc 
~.ntcll;;;;c~t. Ctl-.:.er;~ aJ..~c dnnvn irOlil tl::0 aL:ts of tl:e prnct:i.cal 
intellect - espcc~ally tn thu rcncrse o:' conscience, the 
dictate of COlVlcjcnce to u.ct mor<":~.l1.Y tl 1 ;cin3t the r•ciJeli.ion 0 , .. t"'e ~t,O''""-· a'Y"lu'' +-o c1a"'~"'z0 ~,.~,--. ·"'"'0""1 e~·,-,n.,.c thr> :,,..,d.,. +-o 
, ,;_ ..,J. , - c_l ,l.;. ..._..., V ...,.J,. • ' V- "-' V V J J J\, J::-" "-' ,j ~ J ""-" U """ -.J L.r 
de&th, if ncocl 'vo. ':!tj.ll cU.fferont ar·gt.rwnts aro :'::n.md h: 
trc a:'fect:.:::J.c of the ·.·::111, wl::!.ci:. can have no r·est except 
ia ~;od, -.;;t.1.cl" fehJ-s, '0-:/ tLe sLoer itlpl:lsc of ito natu.re, 
tLe pu.ni:shrr.ent in an after-life, and desires that happi-
ness whic~ it does noL find on earth.' 7 
8. 
Ha turE li..nd. b:f:L6C ts 01 r :ua nt.:i. ty In J3odies 
If wo cou.lU. under·stan6., b;{ a kiLd. of intuition, the natur·e 
of a spi:i.·it, -,.Je snoulcl not bave to tso bt;yonu a par·agraph to solve 
the :proble;u of this treatise. As a matte1' of 1uut, vve nave nc 
l·eally intuit i vc kr..o .. le clge of ar: .. ;./thi.nc ir1 tnis 'i;Oll.d; <.:-1 thOil6h 
om· nearest approach to tr1is is tne knowlcJ.2,e that v;e hsve of 
[;1G.'~C.1:ial. bo·1ies. If v;e :;:;ne\'1 v'lhat. a :Jpirit is, a:.:: easily and 
completely ad we kno·., the r::.l Lure of a body, 'lie could ia!.:e6.iately 
::;u~' t~w.t even \'Jhen these:. tr1o a:r·~::; u.uited. into ow:7 Sl.lbstance, che 
spirit is so inuc:pendent of the body that, whatever n.a..,pens to 
the latter, Jche for'l!l€1' ·.·Jil:. remalu s-u.18tunl;i&lly ·i.lnuffectiGd. 
As is is though, all OU.I: first r.anC:. infor·mat ion is about 
bodies. Ou1• earliest experience has been v;ith material, con-
crete:. realities. :;;;very~vhere around us, wtutever· r,e touch, see, 
or r1car is matter and body. :;:.'he mar·vcl is that :18 should. ever· 
i1ave ccn~e to knO'u anything else t;mn 11 the 'Julk of boclies. 11 
:;:n thE.- cour·se of our study, we shall G.iscover that jus·c ti.iz 
powei' to uttain to th kno;~ledge o:L tihin{;3 othe1 than 'Jod.ies 
t<i ve s us the cJ.t:ar est insir:;h t i..v1 to the nature of spiritual 
be in,; • 
.At the ul<.tset, ·, e mi,:,nt siupl:J call .:.t syirit sometnint; 
ths.t is bodiless, and thun fs'D on tu describe t;nt: activiti3b of a 
~-
spirit like t h3 hllr.Bl:i. ::Dul. Uur rlescr-iption 'NOU..ld Clescri'oe bu.t it 
.1oul<l not prove li he char·ac ter of L".an 's des t in~r. .J e need. more than 
a descr·iption of s:pirtual su·ostance to see how man at;t.ins D.is 
iestiny and v1hy he must at .:.;a in it in one '-lvay and no other. Con-
se,1.u.cntly, we may not assume the radical de.aial of icientity bet-
~~een matter anc~. spirit, but must invest if1'l, tE- v.hetner· there is 
E". differ·ence between them at all and vvhether it is so great that 
each reality is capable of existence apart from the other. 
':Cher'e is a clue to the method of our investiga ti.').n in call-
ine; u Bpirit something bodiless. l:et us fir·st understand. clearly 
anci exhaustively the nature of a body am:. then, if we come upon 
an entity wi1ich sh011S noth ill0Y; uodily in its makeup, we 8.1' e be-
,r::imling t.o handle the substance callea a spirit. 
Off hand, there see ins to be an endleos diff icu..l ty in t:r:ying 
to get a clear notion of the ultimate nature Qf 1~tter or body -
Llnclerstanding by its ultimate nature, the last physical consti-
tuent whic[1 is comlilon to every bod;-,r. Ther· e i~3 such a variet;y of 
corporeal things. No two of them have the same ;:;ha:pe, wei~ht, or 
color • .:Jome are ver·,;y lar,Q'e. ~',lOSt of them are too small to be seen 
by the nakeG eye. 'f.lhen, too, we are so -.v ell acquainted with them 
tiu:,t whatever they nave in common is liable to escape us because 
01.1.:: :pr&ctical use of material things d ..e:pends rather on knovdng 
their surface d.iffuences than their inner so.meness. 
But here, as anyr1here in the study of ;,hilosophy, we must 
sLa rt from ex-perience and then, by classifying the do. ta found.., 
10. 
i.aduc e & bene ra.l :princi:pl e to ace ount for this ex :per iuen tial in-
forruation. For·tunatel~r, v;e can begin bJ rel;J'in2: ou the correct 
notion which peo~la have about bodies. Let us uall this a spoL-
taneous oonLon con::;ent on ~·~(u;.t constitute;:; a boJ;y, or· one of 
those na0G".._ral jucigrnen t s demt:cmG. eJ. for tte basis of all know-
c>..r'e to be cr'edit8d Itith rational convictioLs. 
il..ccor<tingl;;r, we begin i.J:y examinil'lt!; as n:an~r &!1c1 dif.1erent 
kinds of thin,;;;:, as possible '.1l1ich are t;eue:;,:ally ca:led bocl.ies. 
,.e are not concerned here witil ~ny source of movement cr· genera-
" 
tion vmioh these bodies ma;y pos;::ess an:i b::· reason vi which we 
JGnside:c them li v inp,. 'Tne c oncentr· at ion is upon iJodics as 
such- ph:)'Sical, n-:tural, solid bodies. ".rld. what d.o we find? 
·rhe vast bulk of the visible universe falls ur:der this 
classification .... ,. fev; feet belovJ tile crust of t~1e e&rth, organ-
ic life is r&r·ely found, E:.rui then only in vvat2r·, v,ner·e oxyger,;, 
may be hall at least in :Jolu.tion. ;~o again, a fer/ ::!::eet above 
the Sll.l'1ace o.f the earth, lifeless mat~ce:c - synon;rmous with 
ou1· :p1·esent definition o:L body, is the onl;:; l:inJ. of realit;y-
k~ovm to c:.n..r~erL;e.ntt~l scie.r:ce. 
='nere is n~) need detailiEi.:; a lone; list of these diffe.:;_•ent 
S)t: ciee:' of bod.ies ::.:,wl st1·ipp in;? th0rll cf thE;ir uncom.lJOn pro-
eomuon. Tne anc.l;;Tsis iJ too easy. -"11 borlies have q_uanti ty. 
11. 
radioactive emu;.1Cltions - ull r~ave q_uantit;y, i.e., all of tht:m 
sho·,;, o.ae or more ':..uantita tivt:; jn·o:purties 'Mlich ·vvill be mor·e 
clearly de3cribed ls~er on. ~his truism is variously expressed 
b:; St. Thomas. 
'r-;o bod;::,r is found tc contc..in .:.:..n~)'thine.~ except 1J;y 
.:1uantitative ::;orruensuration. 1 ••••• 1-.. bod;y .. is a ::livisible, 
oontinuous thing. 2 ••••• J.;;ver·;y budji has ti1..Cf:-e dimensions, 
le!J6'.;r ... , b::8adth am depth.' 3 
Eowever, it is .,iell to ~~ecp in mind tnat this peculiar 
property co;unon to all bodies does not make them what they are. 
Quantity does not, in itself, constitute a body ..... measureable 
u.ni t ot matter, ss.;{ a crystal of quartz, is not a body because 
i";i has ti.1e proper·ties of size, welght and surface. These can 
all be made to vary under certain conditions while the sub-
stance, that is, the homogeneou~, self sufticient unit, will 
remain tn0 same. The only inference we draw at this :point is 
that v~he::.·ever we :Lind a body we sm.:.ll invariable find. Y..uantity; 
and what is more impor-..ant, wherever ·,'Je have ll.uantity "''e al-
ways have either a body or at least sor11ething bodily • 
.i.i.l though it is not strictly necessary for the advance of 
our proof, we might use this common pr·operty to formulate a 
good definition of bodily subst&nue. On the basis of a constant 
experienoe that certe.in substances are ueve1·, naturally, with-
out a common accident, we .may logically t:trgue the.t these sub-
stances h&v e a natural aptitude or demand for· t nis auu ident. 
In the prevailing order of th1ngs, they uannot exist without it • 
. A.n,l <:..11 the substances tba t ··;e call bodies are bound up with 
lZ. 
an accident, neve::theless ·No have c.t :per·.Lect right to ucEine 
bodily substo.:1ce as any self suboistent unit \vhich is bound up 
with y_uantity. St. Thomas come~3 cloGe to givin(; u;:; the defini-
t ion in so muny v1ord s when he compares ."-v..e:mt i ty vJi th corpor; eal 
suhsL1nce:. 
T Of ail tr1 e aoc iC.t:nts, q_uantit.;.r is t i:le near· est to a 
subs tunce • T '± 
.,e ar·e not particulal'ly interesteu, thougn, in formulating 
a cief ini tion fol' bodil;/ subst ::me a. .:e N isn ouly to tmders tand 
t.1e ird:;LJatc nature of qu~::..ntit;:r and. see how inextricabl7 
liru:eJ. it i3 wi tt1 every physical body. 
Fhilosa-pher;s ~1ave 1~cwer roc.lly tr·ic~ to cleline q_uantit~/ 
becau.se it is suctJ. c. p::::imary t~1ing. If ever· nto ;::ee is to 
.«cnow" was tr·ue, it cert[:dnl;/ is in thL:; case. 0till, y;e shall 
better ap:p1•eolate ~lOW :uuch the concept of ~uar~ti ty inulucies 
b;r :r:evie·,,in_:"'; some of the · .. ays in v:hior~ t;hc reslit.J of y_--..w.ntity 
f[JL· .. Gifests itself. h.11Y one of these ::r.a.odes of u~D..e;.ntit;,r 11 is a 
:loubl8 in:iex: first to t!:le inherence of q_uantity in a S"2D-
st&nce an~. then, to t'.1e natu12 of the subst&nce itaelf. 
The r:1ost ;:;cnGl'ic fcrr:u fi~1ich c::.uaHti ty ass·J.me~; ia 6:xtension 
,-sy cvntirru.ousneJs 01 exL:.nsion, I deEHl: ca:pabls of 
o e in::'< d i vi d.E:: d in to pa1 -~ s tn& t can ir.. the il· t1LTn be 
1~. 
sorrtething \'ihict: is ~Lisposeci ~,o bei.!Jf; u.iv id.e6. :: ·:1to a teoretics.::..-
pa3sive or receptive sic:e of n.separ·atior:. ir..bo par'ts" • .:;;o -GhuJ..; 
,r ... ilc a sHbst&nce i2 still actmlly Dne an,~ u_n,~ividcci out 
.::.ivLJiblc, it i~~ saiC:. to bb ext0nded. or· contin~J.Ous. 
of C..ivisior~ into :par·ts an:l. concentrlite on 'chis c~lC.\l"ti.cter·istic 
:.:~lone, v.J are tre&tir.:,_; tiLE:: ij_visibility V1l:iicl1 accorq:.a.nies 
ro~.uantity. \,ithout c;_uantity, ther·e is no Civision in to6.ies. 
'·,hen '"uan t i\'l is r• erj:ove d, t;V er· y s 1.1b s bane e b o cow:;::; 
inC.:.ivisible. 1 6 
1.Jody, limestone, fu:::: exarnyle, unle :Js this !-~od.y pc ;_,~, er-3 ed. 
c,Lantity v.e co·.:J.s. never' d:rJ..plicete; tv.o inclivic;_w:.tL.: of tne same 
i.:..•.'J:ST;ancc anyvJclc.~.·e in the universe. "c cr·..:.Jtal o:L thi3 SL.i.tJ.Jtance 
.ould. be .s.n isolate C:.i.ltity, cc.,__'l_ple tel;'/ ,:.;_if_ er·e.:.1t in :1ctiL:..·..:~ anC. 
o: t ne s&uiu cL1emic;&l m::. turc ar·e mul tipli.erl t<.:i iaC.i v id.\,jl.t.ls by 
''i_uantit;y, ·,_:lich t~;iveG d.ir:lE:lk'Jions, 2-J tne o·<J..y thint; 
whicn, by ita nc.ture, cau3e s ths r::rultiplicd t1on .1 
inli.vic-;.-w..;.ls in th'..: sa;Je s:pecies of no.'cural .:m.~:::tarJcec. 1 7 
14. 
Aristotle d.czcrites a tl1ird effect of c;_uantit;y U}..Jon the 
su'cutancE:- q_uantified, v;llich :tolloYJ.S olose 1:.~~-.m ths first two 
1 J{lB.t is reall~c peculio.....:· to i.:i..UCEtit:i.es i::; that ',\0 
JOlr~:;~:rc or 00.c.1tras t t bem in terms or on {,r·ound.3 of e~-c~E:l­
ity. Gne .:::o:.:L··~ :i.3 eu,_uo.l to ano'uc ... 8l'; &~ot!:J.e1·, pc:· co.1tr·c:-, 
is Ull8L.:ual. Uf 1wt nir .. :: save 'lu.an ti ty ua~1 v1e af::... irm tLEJ 30 
t·.-vo ~el'I11S1 20 that ou.r callin,,:, souetrdnt:; eu_1.>.al or un-
ey_c,,_;,l is Jul;.c mark, <... bov0 all r:.al'x,_3, o:L y_u..antity.' 8 
:~o.'J necesi:iuril:· thi2 txai~ i.3 liritceL~ .. i ti1 VJ':.~.dteve"J is q"LLanti-
1 
••• n;oasru·e. i: tnat b;y· · .• ~den the q_uauGity of a t:1ing 
is rcuognizet. 1 ~ 
·;;rlictl are not so Ln.~ortant &s th8 r.~n::•Jeding but IJhicr1 maJ help 
·J.s to t;:r:as_p tL1e 1'subst< .. d1ce 11 o:f an u.nc1uantified a.ncl spiritual 
naGure; whatave:::· can be rffiaS'L..l'E.cl does not allor o:::: cont:r'2}:isc 
1 :::_uantiGies neve:;.: hav£::; contrdr.i.es, ior-, -~~l&t L:i not 
uudt:rstoo:3. by itsel1 but mt;.st be :f>.w:·tl-.81 r·efer:::ed to som.e 
standard., hO\'J can t, ,:.at i_1avc any CGli·c.:::·ar~,r? ;.:."U1Jl,JOSir;.:; we 
&C'uit that Great, ::3mall c.:nd tr1e lL;:e are co.ntra:.:ios; then 
it folloi'~S tJ:J.G, t; ti:e S&ElC:: sut,jeut &t one Q..l:ld. the saGle time 
allows o::: cont:.-G.ry :r;ro~dl t;ies, <::..nci ·iJllings ,dll be contl·ary 
to tiJ:Hasel',..;S. Ho-;, ofteL L.; ilO.pJH..l~;J ;"d""t the 38lite thing 
i::.J us nxcJr1 .;rest 8.8 sr:i<:.ll. Compa1·c:: .• it~~ one thint2: it is 
tjrc::..t, comp&.:i..Jl Ydth a.r.Luci.1.er· it is small.' 10 
uO also, y_·l.4antifiecl 211titie;::; oax1. never be spoken of as l .• o~:e Ol' 
Less 
1 c:~uant i ty i,;:.i. no wise admits of d.egret:s. :2ake ntv;-o cu-
bik; long," f10r· exa1nple; t:Ji2 :H.:V er· &c~Jrlit3 oJ~ ~•n.Y (.)raQ.c:,-
tiolls.' lJ. 
,.. 
Presence Of ~.uanti t;r :Ln BocUl_x :~ffee;ts 
8o far, v;e h2 ve cons id ~red onl;;t the r~J.anti tat i ve nature of 
9 bodily Sl.<.bst~:;.nce and GBVe seen tnat it has C:..irnensions, mass, 
anl. 1')a1·ts which are Ll~initel~r divisible. This was the inductive 
si6.e to our investi['"at ion oi: LiS tter. l:ow vve shall start 'bae;k 
i:rom the general :r;rinciple to lind SOL.le of the impl1cc.tions it 
involves. 
Jince every material substance possesses <iUantit;y and 
every bei4~ functions acco.c·(tir:~;:; to ius own peculiar nature, r~e 
are ,justifieC. in lookirl{ for ~Luantity in every effect that a 
boLl~r produces. ':2his need not; wean "'Jhat all the properties of 
'~c'l:antity v...ill be cliscover·able in every bodily effec·c • .;~cause 
does not have to exhause its powers when it produces somet:1ing. 
1,ie should be satisfied to find even one !'tell-tale:· mark of 
({u.antity to say that, Hhatever othe1' influe.r..ces e.t1tored into the 
;:1aking of an effect, if there is 2. (1.uantit2.tive tiLge to it, one 
influence in its :rn•oduction was 4_Uc-=-ntified. :r;o other• ex1;lanation 
woulcl account for even cl trace of quantity. 
It must be <luite cle::U' b:' nov. wnere we cnc l8aclin:'; all 
.;hese discussions; towards tr.c point where vJe cLn ::Jhow t~mt 
tne:r:-e is an eJ..fect produced in t.he wo1·ld of visible r·eality 
·.vh.ic~l bears none of t i.1e rrtaLk:s o:~ c.~.uan ti t~i • ;p he effect in c;,ue s-
tion is hur:JEtn tno"J.~t, in every stage o:f its al.J;;Jt:r·action from 
the liLiiJca tiord of time an~' space. 
lG. 
In the meantime, though, we !-.:ave to firmly establish the 
fact that there is quantity not only in every body as a ::::ub-
:::;tb.ncc, but also in every product in whose making a body has 
had its share. We need not stop to examine the obvious fact 
tl:,a t ev~r'y activity of a upure body 11 ta s quantitative pl'O_pGr-
ties. Another name for this kind of activity is ener•gy, where 
tho axiom on ti~e conservation of energy in a closed system 
immediately suggests itself. Every body emanation - synonymous 
witL energ:,r, has a measureable weight and ::rizc; or, at least 
its transit tlroLc~ space allows us to measure its movement. 
About tr:e passi'Je proper·ties of gross bodies, it is enough to 
recall such s tundards o.s liter, gram, and centimeter, to adr.1i t 
the quantitative ct·aracter of a body in its receptive capacity. 
The real pr o"Llem, however, has to do with the nature of 
those activities wr.dcl: do not proceed from a "pm.,e body. u Do tl:e 
cporations aml products of livi:1r~ bodies also exhibit quan.tita-
tl ve properties? and, may we, therefore, conclude that even 
when a body is activated from within, i.e., fr•om an interior 
sol.;.:r·ce o:f powe1~ wbich philosophers call the vi tal prir-ciple, 
st:lll, the lifeless or ine1•t part of tt)eir being intimately 
s "ares in the ac ti vi ty'? 
We muB t give a deal of attention to this vital principle 
or so·,1l of an OI•ganism, if we wi:3h to fully distinguish it 
from the vitalized princ •.ple or boclJ proper. 3t. Thomas proves 
in one paragraph that tnis vit&.l pr:Lnciple: 1) is not a body, 
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2) is without quantitativt:J parts, 3) unites the separa.'ble, phys-
:teal parts of the ori;anisrn into a homogeneous 1e'.nit or sui.)stance. 
'Every body is divisible. And •:1h.atever i:::: divisible 
demands c omething to hold to;so ther and unify its parts. r 1 
By part8 tere, we st~ould underntand all the varieties of 
chemical compounds t~ at go to form the ph:;'s ical makeup of a. 
body, in ever-:y grade oi' life. In general, they will be carbon, 
calc :turn compounds, water, and mineral salts of different kinds. 
Wh.a. t St. Thoma::: is arguir:.g for is a sufficient reason to ex-
plain the marvelous coherence of a glomeration of uncommon 
phynical ine;reciientr: into a conu;wn wr~ole with a common purpo-
D i ·;e function. 
'If the s O\>l we1·e a body, it vr~u.ld itself need some- ' 
thing to bind it:J parts int.J a unit, and then this other 
someth:Lur: wo'.lld oe the soul. We can apprec:!.ate hov1 indis-
pensable this binding force is, when we see a body begin 
to disintegrate the moment it loGes it::: soul. F'or the 
sake of argurJent, let U.''l suppose tba t the soul is a body 
and that what "bomoe:e'J.lzes" the soul is some thir:..p: di vi-
sible. Well, we still cannot be satisfied until-we como 
down to an indi7isible and bodiless principle which ex-
plains tl.e unity of an otherwise ununified :mixture of 
:r;arts. This indivisible thing will ·oe the real soul -
unless we want to admit the impossible sol1..1. tion of an in-
finite series of unifiers and uni~ied.' 2 
I:: hi:> con:ur;.Emtary on tl·.e second book of Aristotle's De 
An:T.ma, St. Tl:oma.s ,~oes to some t length to show just what the 
soul is in its var;yi;:1b gr·ades o.:: ... perfection. The diffic"LJ.ty 
arises from the fact that physical bodies are differently 
unified to form d:t fferent classes orliving beings. He propo-
su8 the d~_fficulty to l:.i:::.self: 
'3ince the soul, wl-:.ich is the:; S:)Ul'CC of life or move-
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ment, determines the VOGetatj_ve, s0nsitive and intellect-
ual properties in different organisms, the question is 
whether each of these capac:. ties is the whole soul or only 
a pa. r t of it • ' 
Tbi3 question l"lls an important bearing on the r•e;_ation between 
1ni.nd 'lnd hmnan sou.l, vvhether tLe two or identical or not. 
'The vegotativ·e faculty in orc;a::-dsms capable only of gr·owth 
and nutrition, an ir:~ p}.aats, is the whole soul. Howe~rel', 
in organisms which have growth and sensation, the v0geta-
tive and sensitive powerG are each only a part of tl~ soul. 
In general, thcr•efore, those livint: substances which poss-
ess only one of the above capacities, identify tr~is capaci-
ty with their souls. But when an organism has several of 
tb.ese enere;ies, any one of them i3 rather a part of the 
soul than the soul itself; with this reservation, that 
the so1,1 in quest.icJ!l is called after its r.J.gLest vital en-
ergy. r 3 
This classification of' organisms agrees with our daily 
e.xperie nee. Hence, the search :for quantity in the operati ::ms of 
or;c:;anic substances is simply :::•ostricted to plants, animals, and 
men. 1f!e need hardly mo~ce than n:ention tte evident measureable 
properties o:· vegetative f1.mctions. Tbe very fact that the high 
est activ1ty of a plant so11l is upon tr.e quantity of the plant 
sb011ld be enot,gh reas::m to shmv how completely dependent this 
vital principle is U)on tre body it animantes. Early in the Sum 
~~ St. Thomas describes life in general: 
'The name, "life, u is taken from a ce1•tain external 
property possessed by certain things, namely, the c~paci­
ty for self movement.' 4 
Th3n, in the De Anlma, he explains the vital movement in plants: 
(V'3c;etative movement is) 'the movemen.t or chan[~O in ·.vhich 
the bul:~ of a uod;;· is increased or decreased ir ... all direc-
tions.' 5 
Clearly, a vegetative s::>ul is so bound to the physical body it 
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vitalizes that its whole ef'fect is spent on tr:..e body itself'. 
Not only is tLere a 11 tinge of qnun ti ty.'1 ir ... tl:_e operations of' 
~mch a soul, but the:tr entire sphere of activity is li~ited to 
reg'J.lath•e the wss or bulk of the plant. 
The v::.tal prlnciple in animals requires more careful at-
t0ntion. In animals as in plants, the soul is the o:rigin of 
t;hP. t spontaneo·,w a.c ti vi ty which makes for the continued per-
fee tion o1' tL.e uody it ?.nin~a tes. Zven a superficial e.:xamina-
tion of animal <Dganis:ms will tell us Vtnt they need o. sur;er-
ior kind of soul because of ti1e grea tel"' complexity and delica-
cy of t ~)e ir !.Jodi ly s tl'UC ture. }3-u.t let us not ue misled on this 
point. So far as the physical body of ahimals is concerned, the 
most that tt.eir souls can do for :.t will be to keep this body 
in organized G:xistence, nourish, m~lre it grow, and allow it 
to reproduce its kind. In reality, 1Ve cannot separate the ani-
mu.l soul froP.l its oody, but 1.'10 can easily distinguisL the pur-
pose v1hich its bony and soul serve in relation to each other•. 
Tl:ough we might give some proof's tu sho~v that the vital 
principle of an animal fulfills the purpose of its existence 
v:l:en it 11 does all it; c an11 to preserve and perfect the body uni-
ted to it, this will not be necessary to develop our argument. 
We shall 0e satisfied to analyze only the means wr.J.ch a sensi-
ti ve soul uses to attain its purpose. :i~ven less, we shall exa-
mine only the best means at its disposal for any traces of 
"bodily adulterat ~.on" and make our conclusions accorctingly. 
Observation tells us tbJlt sens&.tion is the hit;hest func-
t:}.on of the vital principle in aninals. 20. T!::r ou.sh sensa ti::-m, an 
ani:nml can f~.ad the f.:>od, o.m1 find or make the shelter it needs 
vvcll the nature of sensation in f~oneral. Ccmsciov.s experience 
&:ld the stucly of animal habits toll us that sensation means 
some kind of rece:,;tion of th.tng8 fr·om the outside. In passing, 
wo may say tla t the things recei iT.gd tl~ro·J.t;h sensation are al-
ways re pr 3 sen ta tLms of inC::l vidFal bodily 0nt it i e;:. But more 
of this later on. Por the pr•esent, we arc COi.'.siclering sensation 
only as tho be:Jt mea!J.s that an anirual can use to fulfill the 
end of its existence. 
If 'lm can sho·w tr~&t sensati:Jl1, for all the "tenuousness" of 
its product, the senstjle sp3cieG, is :Jtill a bodily thine, then 
we n:r>e in a position tc invest::.c:ate the t~.-p:lca1ly hwnan function 
of abstract thought. Ar:tst.Jtl6 civ•-;s a short desc.ript:ton of the 
sensitive fT x o s s, in. ilis 2.)e 11.niraa. 
1'Jlith re.f'o:..·o·J.ce to cel:"'r:~tion in .'~;el-·.oT•aJ, wo muat under 
stand that a se118e is cs.:::a ulc o~ rocei vL1g into i L:::elf se!'l-
3 :i. iJle :f:)r ns Hi tho ut. their no. t ter·. 1 6 
ir0c.. -,e or form 
•. J 
in taken in ••• 
r just as wax t;akes into itself the mark of a rinc wit 
out its iron or c:old.. It r·3cei 70 3 :l_n tu i t.sclf a t;old. Ol."' 
!)l"Onze ii'lp:;."'e s 8L:m, uu t n:::,t as [:;old or bronze. In like 
manner, a se"-:..3e i.s L:ipi·eJscd by every O.Jject that po:::so::;scs 
color, flavo::..", or GOUllfl - not in so far as each o.C these 
objects bears a given nL.:ne, out in so far as it has such 
and 3UCh a quality. TLe organ of sense is fundane;ltally 
that i11 \Vhich th:t.s pO\ier o:: b-:dnc-; il1ipressed exi;::,;::::. It 
he.s, tl1erefore, an identity wit!1 the object th.at nu.koG the 
impr.:;ssion, out tn the mode of its o;.;yression it is 
different.' 7 
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. !e mL.y, then, de··'ine sor:sat.:!.o~1. wj_th Aristotle as: the assit,i-
;;i tLo~ t its n1a tter. The impor tc.:lt pr..rase in thir.: dei':Ln:i tion ls, 
11
-.vi t J:-D u t its matter. 11 Hha t zloo s thi ::-; me ::..r;.? 
\io hav::; a1reac.l:.; seen tlit::. t '3 ver·y o ody anu uoJJ.l-y- prouuc t 
ti:..ts c;_ 1;ant i ty ·.vl• ich :t t alv~a;rs i i.1 v -:;lvo s in its makeup. When 
,d U.t:.:;ut ti:lG '_r· _,n tter, t.loc::: ho mc<Otn Lo 0xcluc1e quanti 'c-y from 
3tain of quantit~. 
3C;!1:JD.tion. 
kind of form i.;ha t 
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'J:l-1e eJ\l~l,0ncu 4:Jl··j_r_:·,l: u tldrl£:~ l~:_r..L~ :r1 "tlie s~~.ato o~ ce!l-
sa~:~_Oll is vJiG~t.\J11~~ 111a·Gtto:r·, (JUt 110t ~vitY~CJl;_t !.n.di"',.ricl1.tatin.[;, 
rna te:c ":_a 1 cc nili t i 'J n:: ••• ' 8 
2 "" V• 
vHA .. :'1..L: V 
;,hel.·e should. vie f!P to be convinue6_ thali man's thoughts 
ttr•e unt;.Ju.checl. by q_ua.:.J.Jcity'? No amount of IJhiloso:pr:..izing vdll 
UOllVince us. BL...t bet;;cr· Ctlan tr·;'linr.:; uG pove b,y any :Pl'OC8S8 of 
re&sonin.; that our· thou_,s;hts have nc q_uantit~r, v;e c&n see the 
:phc.;.nun1enon Gaki.tl.[.S place in oc_n· r:dncis. ii bit o~ selr' 1·e:Lleation 
,~i tt1 any i:lea :::.r:. whio ~l we chose to foou..s om· &t .;E~ltion. Bu.t a 
more effective vJa;.{ \dll be to follm. Jt. }~U.t:SU.Stine and his 
:L1·ienci i:!.vodius in the anal;ysiz tney made toc~ether at Ca3siacum, 
.-,he:;:•c the _probltjm of the q_u.anti t"y- of the soul ,vaE uu:~er i.a:ves-
t ie:;at ion • 
.i!.VOdiuJ is on tt1e thirc: o:L ilis s everl c.;_uest ions on trw 
natur·e of -~he s-::ml. H~: has al1•ea6.;y been s"'tisfied on: n.d'J.6l·O 
Cici_ the soul c:onie froL1?n an:::. "•ihat h; the soul made of? 11 ~ie 
i:::, nm' as._inc:: n_:..row lalgs is the s oul?n ;hile listening to the 
~;ns,.,er he receiveJ, we uan make tne introspec;.;iun necessa1y to 
understand. the un(J.uar:tified pro_pe:;.-~;y· of om ti:low.;hts. 
'lmgustine: ~'irst, I v!ill sho'., ;yo"J. that tL.er·e s..:ce 
l:Jau, ti~1illt:,S whic:1 ·Ne ~Jannot sw.y are nothins t>n.J. jec, ;yot:. 
vvill not finQ in them any :):. 'cno::;;e s 1;a t ial CJ.Ual i ties tnc.. t 
you al'O lookinG, for i.E tne soul. So ·!_;:...·,..:..e is this, that you .. 
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will l'lOt onl;y &dmi t Gh e soul to be something al thou.g;h i ~~~ 
has no length or other· ciimensions, but yo1:. V1ill agr·ee 
·,:,i th rae iJ1at a soul is to be consid.er ec"l as much more 
noble &s it has none o:L thase prOtJC:l·ties • 
.i.Cvod.ius: Follo·,; an;y ord.E-1' ~ ou wish, :;: ai.tl read~/ to 
lis ten and. le ::u· n. 
Aurs. :2~1AriL.~ you • .But first I vvant to ma~;:,c:. su..::'e t~1.& t I 
si1all not be trying to tec.ch ;;.au what you kno\1 already. 
r.rhis tr·ee here- I'Li su:·e you 1 ll adLiit it is not sira}.::ly 
not hin5 • 
.c.vod. JIJat u.ra 11 y • 
..... ug. .. ell, t .t1e n, w.1u t at o u.c jat; tic e '? .H.re y-ou. e~ually 
rec:...c._,y to ad1.ait tna·c justice is SOI:JE:llt1ing even better than 
the tr· ee we: are s itt inc:; under? 
.c:..vot1.. :1n,/, of cou.:cse; ther·e is no coi,lparison between 
the two. 
Aug. You are ve1.:~ agreeable. J3ut J ee VI hat your· admis.:;-
ion '1{:~ms. If ·,.e sc..y th::,t thL-3 tr·ee is wur·th les3 than 
:1ustice - less beond every measttre of compa.::.:·l~on, and you 
g-ranted thc:t t t .he tree is not no thine:;, shoulli we concluue 
that just ice itself is nothingi 
.!1vod.. That would. be s tupi1lity. 
Aug. It c er· w inl...v vvould. J\.1 thouch, per haps the only 
rec.son ;rou sale. this tr·ee \·1as something is because it has 
length, thickne~"'S, anli solic.ity, anl that if theze wer·e 
tt..ken awc:..y the tree would vanish into not;hing? 
..GVO(l. So it seems to me. 
Aug. A.n.O. justice - <vhicn you. clair.H:;G. .vas not nothing, 
or rather, that it v.as sor.Jetrlir~; far· J'1ore e:;.,cellent than 
the tree ••• d.oes ,justice l:llive c.n:.r lengthZ 
.Gvod. I can't even conce5_ve justice as soniething 
lonB, thick o~ tae like. 
Jt. Augustine goes on for· a 'Nhile, S~10<Ninf; his friend tno.t 
Jche r1u.man soul may •Nell be son,ething reul even t:10ur;!1 it has 
nons of the gross pr'O:pertie:s of size and. shap8. iiis argu.ment 
so fa1· is onl;:.' b,\' analog~r. :;'or· our presE:nt problem w8 are 
·tc.tking onl;y- the r·eferences to abstracted. ideas, 'liher·e the:::e are 
2.11Blyzed for t heii· freedom fr'cra· Cd_U&ntity. 
A few minutes later, tne tv,o men resch a :point in 'GhE:ir· 
ur·gUJnent v.hert! lengt!1, vvidth ancl deptn are practicc...lly, ·::n:..t 
not u·u.i te, denied of the soul. ;:>t. Aut:~us tiine 1v2.nts to clinch 
t,he ar:s·umen t. 
'"mf::• .ferhaps ru;; shall be r.aorc convinced. of this fact 
after• we C81.' dully invest iga tc t~1e.se L:ree notions of 
lene;th, bread.th and. depth. ,.hat I should. like to have you 
(;.o .~.1ow is to get an ideci of length, ... 10 more, just lent..,th, 
vdthout any thic~ ... ness to go \vitn lt. 
Evod. :sori:y, I can't d.o it. lTo r<atter how fine the 
obj<::ct I tr·y to iraagine, a S}Jider's thread, for ir.~.stance, 
it alv:ays has somE: length, b::.·20.C'.th a.n:, third. climension • 
. vt18.teve:-.: these y_-u.alities are, I have tc a6.mit the:J' ar·e 
there • 
.. >.ug. Your ansewr is q_uite corr·ect. =i.owever, since 
;y-ou. already underutand that the:Je three things are found 
in u spider's thread, I can assume yoLA. have 6istingu.ishecl 
oe tvieen them and .kno.~ no,:J they differ· fl"Or..l one another. 
L>.;vod .• ~'rue enough. I ml,st know ho' tLeJ d.iffer, otu.er-
"J~Jis e, ho•:, could I say that the thr:::ad. has 5.11 of them? 
Aug. 'J:ll1ererore, with tae same intellect ·ui th wi1ich 
you distin[:u,ishej. these properties - once they <:tre Hental-
ly separated., you c&n conceive ler1gth all b;r itself. Gnly 
one provision is necessary; that yao.. don't· at the same 
time icugine some kind of boG.y, because no Ltatter what the 
bod.y ls ~ it v. ill invar iatly have these ~"'-lal it ies. .I hat I 
atl asking ;rou to cone ei v e is an unbodily some t t1inc. taken 
~lone, lE-115th can be gr·asped. only by the minu; it ca.nnot 
be found. in any body. 
~voii. I see. 
Aug. L.nd so, if :ro··J. tried, as it were, to ment&ll . .'l 
split tnis length lengt:11ise, you coulc not do it. Or, if 
you could, it woul6. not be mere length but a lung bod;;r 
that; a lsc ~1ad s ome wid. th. 
Bvod.. Very trc:.e • 
.Aug. ""ccor'Llingly, we ma;;r c;ive t~1is sheer length a 
n<:l.me, the name ord.iml.L'il;y ,f';iven it b;y· mat~1ems.ticians, and. 
call i"t & line. 
£.;vod. 3-ive it any naue :ror ..._ please. I'm not interes-
teG. in the names of things o:cw3 t~1e 0:cine;s themselve3 ar·e 
pe ::•f e ctl~r e::.. car. 
,~u,-~. Th.a t' s right. I not only he8.1' :.;ily agree ·.1 i th 
youx at~itud.e but Ul\se you. not to r·sudin st&isfiec. ·.•;ith the 
name u£ anythinc until you have penetr·~::::teC:. to tile reality 
beb .. l11Cl i u.' ~-:~ 
r 
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CHAPTER VI 
The I~tellect - An Independent Subs~ance 
Constant experience test1!·ies to the @.bsence of quantity 
in our thoughts, no matter what ooject tney represent. Tne !"act 
tna.t our thoughts are never una.ssociated with some quantified 
or extended image does not affect tneir "substantial" simplicity 
There are many ways in whlch vte can prove tnat tn::>ughts and 
extended images are absolutely distinct realities. 
1. Deep, internal, intuitive conviction tells us that 
the idea we see in our minds iS not the same ~hlng as ~he simu~-
taneous image we see in our fancy. 
2. An identical idea may be in ~he mind wlth success-
i vely different phantasms ln the imagination. 
3. Tne same phantasm may be 1n the imagination with 
successively difr·erent ideas in the mind. 
4. we simply know that ~he objective reality repre-
sented by the idea is unlimited by space and time. In St. Tho-
mas' pnrase: 
'As is clear t·rom experience, tne in~ellect can .Know 
universal realities.'~ 
·rvnereas, tne objects depicted by the I·ancy are numerically iso-
lated in space and time. 
'The imagination deals with single entities.•2 
5. 'iVe also know, by a kind of unlearnt intuition, 
t.hat many a reality represented by an idea cannot possibly nave 
2?. 
any body to it. Consequently, the quantitative likeness of such 
an object would be supert·luous. Why should the representation 
wnich leads us to know a tn1ng include any nmisleading" and un-
necessary marks or identirication? 
From here on, the task of proving t.ne spiri tual1 ty or· t.he 
soul ought to be easy. We nave berore us a pnenomenon that de-
mands explanation: a real, "mentally t.angible" something, wnich 
is so different r·rom everything else in tne world or bodies 
tnat we do not even look r·or an account. of its exist.ence r·rom 
whatever is tne least bit bodily. 
To begin with, thougnts are ev1dent1y tne er·r·ects of some 
power residing in the human organism. ~e nave already seen that 
every organism below t.ne numan nas a body wnicn is so united to 
another reality, tne source of lir·e, t.hat tne two togetner t·orm 
a marvelous compound capable or· organized and at times more than 
numan sel!'-moverrient. However, we also saw tnat, regardless of 
now delicate or cumplex tnis vital ~ctivity became, 1t cuuld 
~lways be 1dentified by one property in t.he ert·ects produced -
ithese ef!'ects were always somehow quantir·ied. 
Tnen we came to investigate the human composite of physical 
body and vital principle. Again, many of t.ne products were eas1l~ 
measureable in t.enns or size, shape, and mass - unt.il we came to 
:vhougnt. Here we t·ound a rei::l.li ty, just as real as tne tree in St 
~ugustlne's narrat1ve, wnich was abs~lutely devoid or measureable 
or divisible parts. Tne reality was s1mple - integrally, quanti-
vat.ively, simple. And tne question remains: now is tnis strange 
r 
err·ect produced? 28. 
Tnere l.s no need t.rying t.o explain tnis unquantit'led pro-
duct as t.ne er·rect. or· man's body alone. Even though, 
'Among all bodle s, tne •noblest. ls t.he body or· man.' 2a 
still, as a body, 
1 
••• lt con~ains notn1ng, except. by quant.ltatlve corn-
mensurat.ion. 1 3 
Hence, any e!'!'ect it generat.es, wlll necessar1.1y be quantified. 
But an explanation ln terms or man's suul as a bundle of 
nut.rl t.lve and sense powers 1s equally unsatist·actory. Allowing 
t.hat. ~ne Vit.al principle o!' an animal ls not. t.ne body lt. vlt.al-
1zes, yet, t ne mere nobill t.y ot' t.his suurce or· ll!'e does not. 
save lt. rrom depending upon t.ne body r·or ilis exlst.ence. Tne !'ol 
lowing 1nrerence 1.s ev1.dent: Human life and act.lvit.y are syno-
nyms. Human lite and existence are synonyms. And t.nen we see 
t.hat not a s1.ngle actlvl t.y of an animal soul - not. even t.ne ragn 
est., is unst.ained oy t.ne mu.rks ot quan~i ty. Sensatl.on, Whicn is 
tne peak ot' animal productivity, ln every lns~ance shows signs 
or· having passed t.nrougn a vat. out. or· wnich it. always came dyed 
Wit.n some color or quanlilty. Consequent.ly, as t.he animal soul 
operates in v1.rtue or it.s union Wl.t.n a Oudy, so it lives and so 
it. exist.s. Given a body, it Ccin do all t.nree - operalie, llve, 
and exist.; deprived OI a oody, it. cannot operat.e or llve, oecause 
it has ceased t.o exist. St. Tnomas traces t.his quant.1.tat1.ve 
adult.erat.ion or· t.ne sensl.t.ive process t.o its pnysical source: 
1 Seusat.lon is a power wnicn resides 1n an organ of 
t.ne body.' 4 
r 
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What snould be :mr c onc.tus1on aoou"G t.nougnts and "Ghe r·ac-
ul t.y or· t.nought.? Tnere must., or c uurse, oe some special !'acuJ.t.y 
"Go account t·ur tne productlon or aost.ract ideas. rr· two t'unc-
T..ions as closely allied as nearing a:ld v.tsion are a.1r·r·erent. e-
nough to dernana. cllrr·erent. t'acul t.1es, now mucn more so t.ne r·unc-
t1ons or reeJ.ing and lnteJ.lection? Objec"Gs s~ec1ry racultles. 
And t.ne ooject.s or· sensat.lon and of thought. - the !'inal pertec-
"Gions or productions in which t.helr act.iv1ty t.enninates, are too 
r·a.r apart. to be compared. lis Evodius told St.. Augustine about 
Justice and tne tree, "There 1s no comparison between the two. tt 
Tnoughts are not. material things; tney are not solid, t.nree 
dlmensional bodies t.nat can be weighed and measured. But neither 
are sensations. very well, both or· t.nem are the products of 
something more than a gross body. But. thoughts are much !'iner 
ln tneir 11 texture" than this. Tney not on.Ly nave no mass -
something common to aJ.l mere bodily energies, out. t.c1ey nave not 
even the sem blanca or· mass abou"G t.hem. And here they are alo!le. 
Sensat.ions have not the bulk o!' matter in t.nem, out. they do nave 
all tne semblance o:t' ma.-c,ter in their extetlsion, divisible parts 
and measureaOiJ.i"Gy. Tney acquired t.his semblance while passing 
tnrough an organ or the body. 
·ne can, tnererore, rormula te a guod der·ini tion or· the !'acul-
ty or thought by simply denying it tne distinct.ive reat.ure or 
sensation. St.. Tnomas 1s parapnras1ng Arlst.utle in this rormula: 
'The inte.Llect. is an immat.erial (cognoscitive) power 
wnich is not tne f'acul ty or a oodily organ.' 5 
Or, in other words: 30. 
'The inteilectua~ principle, which is called the mind 
or in~eilect, has an independent operation in which the 
body has no share.' 6 
So far, we have isolated only the in~eilectual racul~y, 
wnich ph1losophicaliy we call an accident. But tne argument can 
be advanced t·urtner: 
'Since nothing can operate independen~ly unless it 
ls se1.r·-subsis~en~, according ~a tne maxims that operation 
r·~ows !"rom ac~ual being and ~hat every~hing !"unctions pro-
por~ionate to its na~ure - tne conciuslon is ~ha~ ~he human 
soul, Which is called tne in~eilec~ or mind, is sornetning 
bodiless and 1s self-surricient ln ex1stence.' 7 
A certain amoun~ or· explanation ls necessary to see wny 
man's inte~lect may be taken to mean nis soul. we should under-
stand ~na ~ St.. Tnomas uses the word 11 inteilect" or "mind" in 
two di!'ferent. senses; r1rst, as 'the bodi1.ess faculty wnich pro-
duces ana receives abstract ~noughts, and then, as tne u~timate 
substantial principle in Whicn this t·aculty inneres. According 
to the tirst sense, ne applies the name "mind" in its str1ct 
derin1tion; according 'to the la"Lter, his use or tne term is more 
suggestive and t·ree. 
'fie can summarize in a few sentences tne !'l.ndings just made 
on tne int.e1.1ect. There must be a principle C~:i.pable ot· inde-
pendent. existence 1 wnen experience snows that it. is independent 
in its operations. Tne peculiar independent ac"Livi~y in ques-
t1on is the production or though~, at~rlbuted to a power we 
call ~he intellect. Now, it seems most proper 'to designate the 
whole substan'tial source of an activity by its highest, runct1.on. 
r 31. And we do tn1s vmen we call tne human soul, the rnlnd. Not every 
VlT.a..L numan activity proceeds from the S:JUl alone; nutriT.l.on 
ana. sensat.lon, ror example, are mediated thruugn tne body as a 
necessary Cb.use wn1cn snares in t.helr productl.on. V/nen tne 
human souJ. ls detached r·rom l."'CS body, tnese runctJ.ons will be 
impossl.ble. Al..L tnat wiJ.l remd.in ln tne sou.L arter tnls detacn-
ment, is the capacity !'or nutrJ.tion and sensation - Wll.nuut tne 
capaclT.y ever oelng rea..Lized unJ.ess tne sou..L snou..Ld re-vl.ta.llze 
ano1:.ner body. 
Wnat. is t.ne re..La t.ion beT. ween tnese lower vi tal po,.vers and 
tne r·a.cuJ. ty o!· tnuugnt.? we na. ve a..Lreaa.y reasuned t.o tae possl-
oi..Ll ty or a separate ex.Lst.ence r·or the int.eJ.lecT.ual part or· a 
man's nature. Can we rignt.ly ca.Ll every power ln man oelow nis 
intellect ana. w1J.l, a bOdLLy power? And may we argue T.hat a..Ll 
tnese inr·erior r·acu..Lt.les wl..Ll remain per.Lect.ly S1.er1le arter 
soul and body separate because tnere wiJ.l be no body tnrougn 
wnich tney can operat.e? 
To tne t·irst question, the answer is: tne inT.e.LJ.ect uses 
tne ..Lower powers o1· ..Lire on.Ly as a convenient aid, wrn..Le tne 
soul animates tne body. It can r·reely operate wi t.nout real 
causa..L dependence UtJOn T.nem because experience snows tuat lt 
a.oes. llnatever is, in the present, can oe in 1:.ne !'uture - pro-
v ia.ed t ne c una.i t ions remain t.ne same. 
To tne otner ques t.ion, tne answer 1s SlmpJ.y: yes, on..Ly 1:.ne 
lnt..e..LJ.ectual part or· man's suul is or sue n a nature tnat it can 
go on ..LJ.ving an independent. lir·e whetner it J.s joined t.o a body 
r 
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or not.. Only t.nis part. ur n.1.s bel.ng 1s t.ruly spirlt.ual. Conse-
quent.ly 1 only 'tne m1na. or man 1s capab.Le ur con1..1nued exlst.ence 
art.er t.ne cr1s1s in t.uls .Llre called his a.eat.n. Tne on.Ly ques-
t.lon remains wnet.ner ur not t.ne mlnd, or substant.ial.ty 1 'Cue 
suul 1 will ac'tual.ly enjoy t.n1s privllege r-ur wn.Lcn its na'ture 
nas dl.Sposea. it.. 
r 
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Possible ~ihilation Of The 3oul 
}'ra.nuis Suarez e;,uoteo .:>t. Gregor~r in a ~niver·sal defini-
tion of d.e a tn: 
'Death occurs when tnere i;s a separation of one thine; 
frou anotner.' 1 
Accor•d.ingly, when a man dies, a cleavaf.;G takes IJlace bet-
·Jeen his 'body- and soul. \i e ~"'-tlO'.'I ver· y nell \Vha t ha:p:p ens to the 
devitulized body afte: the soul leaves ic. 3ut tne soul, as we 
shall. see in a m.or:1ent, goes on exerci::3inrc~ its noblest functions 
.just &s thouc::;n nothin,~: haC taken r;lace. ":he ca.pacitJ for con-
tinued existc:J.CE. ,vJ.lich ;;e c.t'cribut~v. ·to it, is ncv·el' fr~stra-
~eu; if it •.,ere, ae shc1vl·l hcve to deny a rcct p1·inci:ple of 
Our ar•gu.m£nt can b8 :r.-etucec~ to s. sec~enc8: Since the hUUlan 
dOUi. i~ cape. ole O~L Llmor·tal life, it '.Jill d.C"cu.ully liV8 immortal 
ly if there is 3UL.iuicmt reG.son v.ny it s:1oulD. not be an ... '1ihila-
ted. 
Ihere is a in .:;;t. · L' i1o 1110. ::; .,, hie; (l sunru& r i z e s Scr1olas-
tic 'ce&cilinr; on t.'.~ a1Jsolute po·~~er· ~f God. tu annihilate any of 
.,£:..at follows: 
r 
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1 It is POt ih:pos>Jible, in tte sense of implying a 
::.:ontra d.ic-':Jion, tr1at Cl'ta tur·e::. z~1oul~'- simul ': not exist. 
uthervdst: the;r vJoul1 nuvc existed. i:r:ou all., ete1·nitv. 
_ Lc:tv1 is c, C-Tod c~o es 1Dt produce ere a tur·e 5 u.ncler· &ny., ._;on-
stJ.·aint of ;iis EC;..ttLre, .JO th8t ~-~is :pc.Jer- ~.oulcl be C.3t6l·-
l!1Lle<l to ·\.ihe e:xistence of a crea+;ur·e. It follo·,,s, then, 
tr.:.Lc it i>J not i:;c,osGl".Jle for· God to rerluce ·things to 
non-exicJsenc.--:;, sinJ£ l·[e Cioea not have to t;ive tr~em exis-
tblCe or·ie';inall;;r- except; on t;.i.e supposi'GlO.::l that Fe 
f Ol'c ~·.ne.:1 a nC. ;;Jl: c orcl£.. in eG. to ~{ ee -r) them e:x i ::, i: inc: pe rp e tu-
all2/•' 2 
ness, :w can easil~r see t;1a t GoG. woul(i !Lever· blot u~.-,_t of exi::-,;-
tence r:hat ~re rla0 pre,J.estinell to liv: eternall;f • .all ,-,e need 
Lie,, is to finu soue ulear evidence for s·c:.oi1 a p~e~'-e::nination 
in t11f c&;;;t=; of man's souJ. ... H.n( v1e llivs it f1·orr. the most r·cli-
:J.ble witnes:oo <:vailablc- t~l:J soul hGrself, t.::;stif~Ti.ng abo1.:..t 
iwrs elf. 
Philoso:pl1ers call thiL teGtimon~; v~~~ich lJl'oves the soul 1 s 
det"..:..nu for- an en1lle 83 life, ti:u; ethic&,l ar·f~:wnent. ~ilor·e simply, 
it i3 notLlin::.; else than the w.1iv31 Bal .l.L:.t<::.r. uesil·e :ior per·-
fee~ ha]piness. 'Jlhe univer·sali~;,T o:: this ciesL:·e is not h:;r.uedi-
utely cvilent; nol' does it rl&VE: -co be. It is e;ncu.s(l :LoJ..· u.s 
ti~t:de. r.:·i1e ~-vllier· is t:Jat men si1ou..lJ. evo come to Occeive tt1e:;l-
presenc fallc.; .. l staJce, ie~, men coulC_ h&vE: co~1vinccr" thernselves 
35. 
us oi ~hi~ tr~tn by S<Jecial ::.· evelat iou;:; 
- , in or d.e r· Lo rual: e us 
mukE:: u;.; consoio:J.s of it - the bEJa:,lfie; ,J..:::sil·e itsel:L. Frow the 
d.a\.11 of r E.;nso.n to his last moment, a wan iz literally lur·ec.' 
ut. A..1.::;ustine has a c;reat d.Go.l to sa;y about t::-ds inborn 
c.t.fJpctite for bcatit-L;_de. In his treatise on 4.:ihe i1ol.y J.:rinity, 
he first ObSt...::.;V6S hO'.I lUltniSt<..._,:eacle this v_eSil'C is &Lc: then 
:proceJe~ to explain it::: nature, :";rad.u.&ll~y le&~lL1,;.:; his rE:Jader to 
conclude; v:ith nLJ v.ltat must be tile si.ngle 1·ealit;y in the ur~i-
VE.;l'Se ir.;, VIL1ich tt:e (les:i.r-e finch:: rest. 
'Inste&G. e;:Z .::x:.yinc .:.L..t :. he a.iO., sup!JOSin.: the poet 
~~nnius had. .:::aid: 'All o:;: ;)ro-c:_ wi8il. to -oe h&..>J!Y and. nom.: oi. 
;you vii shes to be sad. ' 3.e ;,oulc. ~..;hen hav 2 been vo ic inc a 
truth wnich nc one can deny evc.n if he '.:a.m;s to. hhatever 
else a person ma;}' Wi~n. to Keep S€Cl'et, thel r_; lb no h1diflG 
t~is ~e~ire uhich is ~s co~~o~ly experisnco~ ~s it is 
uni ver· ;£ ll J o bse r-v ccc. 
"J:he rru:n·vel is, IJ0 1:18VE-l', tho.~ al t.1.ou.,;u thL:> desi~e i:::: 
so .vicle.s~.:,r&ad, i-L shot<.lu be :::o varied i:1 its :rlanifcst&-
tio.i:lG • .L'he m;,rstcry, t_L:r·efore, i::: not that ::;A;Ieone i::lOL.le-
1tV~lere <loes .nc/c. Hant to be hc.c:P:PY, tuc tha·.~ tner·e rv~~l:.y 
(,;xi:::>~ reo.:;le, and a ::reu-;~ l118.l1J of Jc rh:il1, ·.r:..u G.o not K::10·;; 
.:ilt..t ha)pint~SS L>. :l.i cver·JO!.i.e ..Ltuer:..:;too.::. tnE.:: true nc..turc 
of rl8p_;_ir.J.t:foS, \,e :o:;iloulC:_ no-._; hev.:.: th~ spectacle of r:1en tr·,:-
ing ~c :tinu it in uL1C exe:-·ciae of their minC:.s Ol' the 
:~lee~s~.:>..r·e o~~ tGcir· -cocliez ... [18.t :1u vne denie::::, Gr10~,,11, :Ls 
·~L.a0 c: :'-if'S o:.: be&LiitQcle mea.:.13 a life o.Z those thinr;.:. .1~1iCl1 
i:1 .~i;_ prest;n:L CXfJel:iGLJ.uc nc: cost c~1joys.' ;::, 
r 
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t;iVG LL1, life - ti:1at i"!:i is life. ltl6l'G:fore, hii:J uoblest auti-
vi;.;ies of i:~n-:mlet.ge anci.. love ar·s sure to cuntinu<~ after· his 
"bOC:.;J' cor'rupts, i:2: onl~~ t h.e1·e i.0 soracthi!1f:; tc r"eE>tl'ain the 
[i.llnihi:::..s.·cion of his soul by Goi. 
,;i -~ h ,:) t. .L. ho;llaS , we ;;;a ;y t il8. t Goa will not :r· e luc e anythi.i.l{; 
to non-exist::;nce once .tie ha2 predestined it to inmortcility • 
.((1e mers capa..;it;y of a ~r1ins fc:r· per·petuc:.:.l life .1ill not in-
sure ic;;; ac·~·--~.c..l fulfil1r::ent • .i.~o le.ss 1s -'c1·ue witi1 the hL:r.J.an 
spirit. J:ts inc:.q;enC.ent o;·e::.ation in tl.ll t;nou;Sht :process ::lear·-
l~T Ul'gues to its ab ili t.;· to su..llsis t alone &Hcl -.vi chou·t; a bod.y. 
~.ut V·.ill it res.lly J.o so'? It i:J not enol+';h to sa.; ttat ,}od 
b.<::..l Cces"c:i.neci it to an ii.1't~Ol'·:~aJ. life. ·.:rle Clor,! '[e r·eueives in ::1. 
s ir::::;le L..C t o£ 1nan' s ac~or· irlfs love wo'J.l·i wo1·~:; G han eX:Jla in \my 
God shoul\l ~.ish to e;::.·eute s.n intelligent be·r ... g lik~;.. trle hu.man 
soul •. e have r ... m. onl~, to JeE; w~1etr~er u SlJil'itua.l substance 
~JO sit i v c l~r i unun de inn or "GC..li ~~-'. 
Tht: C<:,Ji<...:.ci't;::: for et e.r·naJ.. life L1 man 1 ;:, Jcul n8. t L.l'ully 
:ilov.:;(" ll.S to looA fo:..' acme ciivinc •H'Oi1lise tna.t .i.L ;,oulu be 
fu..l:t ill ed. .;e foun.l ti:.. is pr·ouis:::: in our na t·u.1· s.l 6. 'c;Sir·'--: for· 1- sr-
feuc clC:..:ppirL-3:.:.:. neyom.~ tt1L }JOint t:l6l'8 is no nee·.~ :Cor f:u·ther 
·.~ill ..:.or~tinue livin,·; into eternit;~. If t:1er·e is <..J.ny clcubt about 
3 r• ( . 
t L:E. concept ac it come::, un ts us from conGe iousness. rermanence 
i3 indispcnsc.. ole to tl1e complete notion of hap:9iness. In one 
place, ~t. fhomas ~oes so far as to identify the de8ir8 for 
beati0"LLG.e ,dth tha desire fo1· e:ternity. 
'A nat"l.t:::.'al desire cannot pos:3ibl~· be f1·ustrated • .lUll:. 
1uan naturally v,rants 1.0 live for·ever • . ie can pr·ove this b~ 
a kind. of syll Of{ iSm: ~<is tenu e is s or11e tniru; whiC~l every 
beinr; G.esires ••• ~ioweve1·, man co,;,.1ceives b.:-' his intellect 
not only present existence &s Enir:lals do, but existence 
witho'..l.t qur:i.lification ••• 1:.,an vJill, ther·.::::fore, en,io;y in hi::: 
soul the lifs o::: eter·nit;y voihich nis mind anticipates.' 4 
r 
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Lan' s D0~t iny - ':l he J:'o~ session Of God 
There ~18. ·:l. t::; be en obvious Lrpllcc.. tion in ·.mn t ';11&8 sa iu 
on the Ciesire fc.:c beJ.tituC..e VV~liCh CO!lV.i.!.l.Ceu US that OlU' SOUlS 
not only can but will be ind~pendent of fut~~8 tihlE. :he im-
)lication ~as that ~his desire is not re&lized by anyone before 
his d.eJ.th. ~t. i:hun1&S e~it01nizes t(lis comrnon experience: 
'~veryone is acreed in calling baatit~de ~ome kind of 
l!e:c•fect good •. o.nd ,,e ma,y :.leiine "Cue lJerfect good. as that 
Y;hich contDins no cdmixture of evil; li::: .. e a pe1·fectly 
~hite object i~ one th~t bhow~ no traces oi ~lack. But 
man, in his :r_:;1·esent state, cannot bs entir·ely fr·ee ll:Ohl 
evils; .not bo~lily evils s·J.ch & s i1unger-, thirst ana. cold -
nor spiritual evils. :~here is not a ms.n livin{ who is not, 
at least SOL!eth1es, distu.r·bed b;y hi.s inor·dinate ):-l&Ssions, 
Viho io not occasionally d.eceive:l cr·, e:d) any rate, :Lails 
to 1.::..aderstand Yvbat nc ''.ould lL~c; to know o:::·, finally, ·sho 
nmst :r-ena.in c;ontent with a vatil'-e oninion on iiiipor·t<:mt 
tr·r;_ths ·,Jhich he '.,ouLl lil~r to com_pr·ehe~1c'.. ~·iith ceJ:'t<:l.inty. '1 
One problem is still le.::.:t uB •.• e nave to lully examine the 
na turt:: of bap:pineds. ::::his examination is, of cour·se, with a 
view to foretellin~; what kind of life the t.Uin::\n sp.:.l'it will 
leaCi u:Lt~r its det2.c!1ment irom trw body • . ie are entirel;y justi-
f i ed ill isola tin; a.:J.c:.. analyzin{; the single concept of hE p:pines3 
unC. pls.ce • .Esse ... 1:;cs an:.;. r.wtures are eteu1al thi.n~~s. ,,he-t iG 
essential to hapiJ iw:. ss today, in even one Elan, is es se.ntial to 
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iwp:p ine s;;;o; irL all a~ses Stnd. pl& c es and b eyo.u.d mec.su.r;eable di stan-
c as a nO. t irae s • 
a iefinition, we shall assc.~Lte t:1:.:: definition, analyze j_ts ucn:l-
tents, anc~ in this vJay comt:. to an unu.:.;aall:.· iull und.erstanJ.ing 
of the life of a separ&~aJ Gpi~it. 
vc:.:·dion, .::>Jli. Aur;ustinc Jeiin€U t:1c nsture of happineos fr·om 
its positivs anG.. negative .side. 
'To -~e happy rs s j_ ·:1Jl · n:..;.:; to be in ·want u~·, Hi o"'Jner 
word..:i, it means to b0 wise. 1 2 
'£o be nappy is to be wise. 1.1o be baatifi.c&llJ happy is to 1Je 
wi;J8 to the lir;.;.i~ - '.'ihere tne li.Jitation is measurc;c~ fc,:.:· each 
::1an accor~.L.nr; to t£16 plans of .2rovidc:.ace upon nis soul. 
It is aertainly evid.en·(; th2.t J;Jeriect joy must consist in 
the possession of somethint~ extremely e,ood, vvithou.t thl; least 
tlanger of losing it. B·~.rt; t :.1 '-~ chm act e:r· of thL; e::..:tremel.;- '-';ooc-:. 
thing a..:1u.. the way in Vihich it will be po .35 es sed - 1CLese i:1a v e 
not been evitle.rTb to r_ca.n: o:L the ce3t :nind.:::; in histor';f •. hcco.:c-d-
.int; to ;Jt • ..:1-gustine's definibion, a person ii.:3 ;:l&_;._J}j~ tec0.u.s.; n~;:; 
callint_: a rr;an ·.;ise, ws ILtco...n to say tr·~at hE: holll.G i.L~ his mine_ 
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oi th3 tr·ut~1 ,,,lOS8 :possession not only maKes a n~&n ',;i.Ge and. 
tht:1·efore [JB.P:P.f, but so CCJL};·letely :Lillo his iflir~c~ Y:i th wision1 
that hiE; wealth is O.i.10li,_,h to last uinl fo:.:' etornit,yi 
:::;~,t1onymous. 
' !hen v10 love a til ir..t- fo:r the d&l:~c of someti:ing else, 
this othe~ object mu~t be loved only fo~ its8li because 
,_e calu1ot assume WJ. endless series o.L obj<::cts d82ired by 
tas natl~r-al dl;J,;etite, \vtH;I'e c&.ch ~ning is de.:J:i.r·ed ::::or tne 
sake of 2no·cher te;yronu it but non-J for· its elf. '.l:o L.lake 
su::;h an ass:..:ui.:pl;ion is ey_u.ivalcntly to,dent that raan has 
& natv_r·c:..l Cl es lre u t a 11. 1 
since exp3ricnct anJ re&son tell us thtit an appetite remain3 
um,ioved until its <:-itt-ent:i.on is focused. upon one object. 
'li'ow, i1 v1e analyze all the practical sciences, artc and 
~1Wilan facul tie:J, voe ar.IB.ll :Linci one -;:;nin{; comLon to <.:.11 of 
them; ·vJitiwut excep1:iior.:., -:;hey cir·e d.esir·eC_ alll-, used only 
for· the sah.e of sor~wt:J.inf~ above themselvea • .i'heir· objec-
tive is not kno;jlc.dt;c itself but sor:tE; Kind. o::: func-tion or 
ope::.·c;, t ic:n • 
.:>pecu.lc:.tive sciences, on tne ot~er hanc, &re vs.luE::d 
for anci in t he1,1sel ve s. '.l' he L.• ob je cti ve or· e1.:.C. id Lno·,,ledc, e 
i·cself anc1 thi::: end i8 ezclusivel? theL·~, ;:;ince among 
-~ll ht.rilli.l1 endeavor·;:; no ott1er c:..o-~ivi-0y but is a mectns to 
some!ji:::i.n:::_: ili<:Sher· "Jt:..<m itseli - e:z.cepli 3-peculc',tivo r·eflEc-
tion. lionae ,;u.ent ly, sin·Jc ph;. c J..; icc: 1 pur•s,~i ts ar·e Qirec ted 
&n(~~ 8ubor•(iinc:.too. to tre llleditative, every 8_ction th::=:1:i a 
man _prn:Zor·ms nuturall;y ;;:;uoser·ve~ the contemplative ]JO •• u-s 
01. hi;:; Hl:i.nc'~. ' .:, 
'.l'his £nalysis of hW1Jar.~. desires io based on l_.h(j :;ali:~ 
God is & ve-r·· :jable hier·druhy o:L :fJOwer·s, each contriblLting in 
-rur·n to <3 povJ.;r· above it, c:nd th3 whole series contl:ilr..Lting to 
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tn8 a~~~van~a,_;E ot: the organize<i substance itself.1,~an is no ex-
ception vO this axiorr, of cr·eate'"l natures • .ie need hardly mor·e 
than a fe1• fects fJ:'OW ex-oe:...'ience to reco,:_;;nize tnis hierarcny 
of faculties within him. :St. '.l:~wmas preawned o.c1 tl.lSC facts for 
parai';I·aph. 'l'he ~1ip:hest huma:1 s.ctivity be:::.ongs to the i1ic;hest 
Ln.m:an facv.lty, \',hic~1 ex})erience 8_e&in tE-ll.s UG is the mi.ncl in 
its p~rely r~ilec~ive cs.pacity. 
'rT!he life Wtlich is proper to man, as li.1&n, i;:;; thE: life 
o the mind. It is rnE..n's reason which ultiraately rnf:lkes him 
VH18 t he i s • ' -1 
r:o',veve.r:, we may ccnsiO.cr the r~:::o.son or· min-5. i.u t:vo vvays: eitn01· 
'by itself o:::' in itiS iafluence upon ot£1er faculties. 
''J.'akint; rll..ln's reason in its i.!1fluenti~l phase, vle call 
cer·tain actio1:1.:s rational bt:cause the ::::'et:..son d.rav:s them out 
and p;u.ides them after· tney arE: d.::'v.an ou':i cf })Otency; but 
Nr"eri we sa;; that there is some activity in man Vihicn is 
r1-.. tional by it3 ver·y .na.t1.1.re, we mean ths.t its perfection 
iz :..'cached in the re&sonintc; or think.ing process itself. 
Gnly tni.:3 latter· open:tion is st:r:iutl;; :::·ational because 
,.,ru:..tever is name'..L from its O\'Jn natLu·e is yrior to that 
which is named. :;:roEJ. anotller· thiu; that aff ectu it. Hov;, 
since hJ:,ppiness is man's hi,,;hest 2:0od, it must necessarily 
oonsist in a h u . .~Sn activity ·vmich is essentiblly and not 
just :rinflue.ntially~: intellectusl. Before all else, there-
fore, hap:p ines ... is b. life o:,: contem:pla tion l'a ther than of 
e:r~te1· na 1 a c-c i vi ty, and consists in the exercise of man's 
1· eas OL or· inte 11 e c t rather t r:£.n his vdll (or any other 
powe~) under the guidance of reason.' 5 
It locs no·t really rnu t;:;er .;nether men in c:;s.neral would 
ctgree v1ith Aristotle's analysi.J of .r ... <qlpiness. 11.ll 'Nill at_~1·ee 
t11at ha11Diness is the :possession o1 the tli[~hest conceivable 
good, but the agreeL:H:nt G.issolves <just b.S soon as men begin to 
identify this hit)1est conccivabl;:; good.. l'nl;;' t£wsc who are 
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speciali:JtF.: i!::c the anc::,to.II.\}7 of ilt:..man faculties ar·e in a position 
to d.ecla:'E: J.ogm2.ticall~· on mc:.n' s r1i[;hest pcss ession. J?aoul ties 
ar·e powers, and pov1ers are vest> els \1hose ·:size" and. 1'shape'1 
d.cter•mines ho>J ruuoh of w:u"t }cind of perfec;tion vvill flow into 
the soul. ~renee, in dcclarin _ _; that man's intellect is alone dis-
po::vcd. to receivE: the most of the best '-c::oou.ness which a L.an can 
acs.uire, v~e ar'e declarine: an L1ference that is not; drawn from 
the exper·ience of men bt:_t ::::::rom the experience of man as he a:p-
pears to the minds of Aristotle, s.nC:.. Sts. ~,.ugustine anu Thomas. 
,; e a.r c nea 1· tn e en C.. of our invest iea tion. '::akint_: up 
.r'msustine' s de~ini tion -~.i.WC n·or'e, ;:;1nCJ<: h'--~lJ:;Jhlcs:: is the enjoy-
ment of \vis c.lom an1 perfect b.o .. pp iness is its perfect enjoyment, 
He have only to U.iscover the nature of that inef:L&ble object 
the men tal possess ion of which pr ocluce s in turn wisdom, enjoy-
ffient and perfect ha~piness. 
'fhe intellip:ible obJeolJ of beatiiic wisdom ll1U3t be a per-
sonali ty. ;ie are easily, c.lmo st i.1.1st inc t i v .:;l_y, sure of chis -
at least a~te r reviewing the 6_is:propo:L·t ion ·oetw een how much can 
be known a bout persons and about. dll oth E:r things in tne uni-
verse :vhicn are less Jchan personal. ':rhc.i.l we are given a choice of 
-chree ways o:L identifyint: this personality. 
We ffiB..JI e;o through the vary in,:,; grades of personal b ei.ngs 
until we fincl one Vi{lOse natur·e i;~ so exalted tha-:.; to undE:::·stand 
him is to kno1-~ every other person and r.~.un-pe::::c;on in the ifiOrld. 
Or we may concentrate our- attention only on tt1e f<J.c,J.lt;y of human 
thought, senarate its povierE, ai.1d then decide r;hat sin[;le objE:ct 
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is so utterly .K.nowable that to r~ve it enter the mind is to sur-
feit tre mind's capaci·Gy for· knowledge. Or, finally, we may look 
back into ou.r mentt...l experience and recall every person, hUI:lnn 
and more than nwnan, livinc~ and dead, about v-1hom we nad every 
thou[;ht. 'iiilich of these reflections was accompunied by the keen-
est pleasure<: Once again, we are privileged to say that the :per-
sonality who c;ause1 us the t:;rea test :pleasure in ti1inking of him, 
is the same one whom we shall contemplate for eternity • .ldter 
all, our minds are not changed at death, except for the better. 
;/n.&tever Knowledc:se is most deeply enjoyable on earth T._;ill also be 
the rnos:; enjo~'~lble sfter cteatn. r;:h2 depth of jo.J will certainly 
be increased for each species or kind of k.no,vledr':e, but the :pro-
j)Ortion between the moHled~;es themselves will remain the same. 
;~e may follo'iJ Gt. 'i:horfJaS towards iden tifyint.£ the most 
knowable personalit~v, accordin5 to t;he first of thte:Se \'lays. 
'Intellectual activities a1~e not onl;y fir'st recognized 
by the ob ,j ects ·vvh ich are known, b•J. t they ar s s :, so specified 
or gradeu accorG.in&; to these objects. Conseciu..ently, an 
intellectual op e:r.·r;tion is c.s much more exnlted. ;3.S the ob,ject 
perceived is inore :r;erfect; so tho..t, ·~he most :p,_:_rfect kind 
of intellE..C~ion Jnea1!3 the und.er·ctandllli~ of the most :perfeot-
ly knowable being, ':vhich is C'rod. 1 6 
And why is God. t.he ruost 1u1owable? :decause He is infin.Ltely act-
t:..al. The mind. c8n perL:eivc nothin; else ·chu~ actw:::.lity. ·~r·uth 
Ol' ,.;is'lom L:3 "t ht· indwellin,g of be in:~ in the mind. ,Jisd.om is 
simply "baing:r in a mental st~:tte. 
The s oconct posaible way of learning v,b.o the :personality is 
that ·,,ill .'i;ivc us eter·n;:,.l happinE:J2S, is to examin(; our fBculty 
of thout:;ht • .u':xamining tile r6ach of its 11ov~ers, 1ae can decide on 
some one ob,ject '.'/hose ve:'y nature is sufficient to c'eplete the 
intellect ·with knowledge • rihen .Aristotle obser-ves that: 
'Yen's intellect is of su.ct... a charact-:;r th~:.t it be-
come;:; a 11 tL1ings.' 7 
he is telling us th&t tnere is absolutely no intelligible real-
ity vvhiCtl o-:.n minds canno"c receive <:.i: bc;come pe1·fecteci by. 
The (_lUestion is, whl..;b or~e amonc~ "li~H~se in:Linitel:y m.w-nerou.s 
re<:.J.lities can so fully sc..tisfy tile in1ieJ lect that. any furtner 
"s:pec·u.l&tionn is no lor ... c?;er J.esil·ed becaU':lG it is no lonf;c.r ne-
ceszctry. uuar·ez ~~lves the ansv;er in a Sdort 1efere.nc8 to ;st. 
Grecory Nazianzen. 
'Of cll i.atelll,:.o;iole ~hings, at the hi,;-;hest Eitlf.1:nit 
is C;:od, in i!hon. eva;y d.E-.3il·e simply comes to a standstill 
ancL is made iw.ELoveo.bl e. lro mind, ~.ovvt.ver comprehensive or 
inquisitivE. can ue car::-·ie6. an~rldJ.ere beyc.nd ~Um. It never 
can nor s·vr::.r: v,ill conceive an;y object hic:;her than }iim in 
su.bli'rli ~:;. i 1his is the extreme of all thinf.~3 that can bs 
striven for; ·ni.1cn ';~e :.:eu.cl1 1iim, every yea.rnin,; 01 Olu· 
s:peol~lative so1..<.l8 oume::.; to a pe1·f<:ct :rest.' 8 
1he last means we have of knov:ing v.rhom ue Ghall contempli:~tt 
c...fter df;ath, is to compare Olu pust mental experiences u..atil Vie 
find Ollt: that v~aa the n~ost enjoyablt:. )e cc...::1 say beforehamt iJl.lat 
the ob ,je c t of our' t hough ts du1· :Ln: ti:J.i. .~ r· e:fle c s ion must have be en 
so;:cw pc,rsonnl beir.J6 • .Ju.b the p1·oof ::3top.:;; he:~e. ~he secr(jts o:.L 
t;2w riLin:.l ara knmm only to oa ch mau hir.1self anC to tb.ost; v r.:1:1 
fe v.l tt. whor.1 he is vdll in,;; -:-..o sha1·c them. ~heJ.' 1Jfore, eve1yone 
must b8 t;.iE owr1 jucit;e in t ~liS matter an~ G.epencl on the exper i-
e11c ss of ot;hers only to thf~ extent of coLI irmL:.1tj !lis mm un-
bor·l:oweC. conviction::· •. 
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of the joy~; pos sibl"- to a man on ~arth. -.nd then he vvas bl\JS sed 
see:r1l t0 be nea:r.>i11{; o~J.r::olves in~:teacl of him, when we r·eucl v,:Jat 
hs 3ays: 
11 dr elic~1ed is the man Vi ;10 kuows all otn er things and 
does not knoJV ~'hee. but harrp~r is hs that knc'. .. J .lh0e, 
-':;r.ou{';h •1C:: 1.oes not ~mor. trH::I::le • .tine~ if he snould knm botb 
them anci lLlec, he L:~ not tne r!appier for· 1~llOr;ing the111, 
but is b..a:9py onlJ because ~1e knows :2hee. r J 
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B;_,~ way of epilogue, ·-t1e ca...'1 :profitable maKe a few ooser-
w,t ions on the study of iHJJOrtE~lit ~'l t !n t we h<lve J'J.St finished. 
l'il"st of all, the:r·e is the c;;,uesT;ion of method. 'i.'hroughout 
the thesis, .r...o Llorc than pass i.ng reference v~as 1aade to the 
Jcholas tic doctrine on r:1s.~ct er an .. forrn, which seeL~s to under· lie 
any :proo:!.: for t!1e spil•ituality o£ the human soul. Uffhan/;, it 
seeE1S to bEl impossible Jvo prove -::;he .Jou.l' s spiritual nature 
"' ~ 
without pr·ovinc, not onl~: that it bas no ~-u.antitative parts but 
also no essential nar·ts, i.e., no matter al'l' .... for·m. Jissolution 
is the separation of parts prtviously uni·cell • ..;onsey_uently, 
m1less ;;,e prove chat the soul tlas no ra1·t;:; liku batter and 
fo.L'm, L10V1 cE.n we :p:::ove th2.t it ·sill not ·issolve? .. hat he nave 
cionc ·,,as siuply not to adve:•:t to tnis obvio-c.:::; fact "'.:;hat -'c(1e 
Lnm.an snir·it ha.:; no cose.ntial COLipositic.Jll, ir~ 'che acce:pteu 
3Cholastic ~anse of the ter~. ~prituality ultimately meana 
COmplete i;:ldCJ:)(:;l:d.ence of {Sl'OSS lll8.c.;:;er • . ie SrlOUl:l never hava 
believed. ti~t such an inicpendence was even possible, if tha 
t~J.e 1nocess of intcilcation i'~ave us all thi.- evid.c:;.cs v;e needed.. 
-rh0 unquanti:i':ied ohar-aoter of ou1· thoUf;nts .ro.s enou,,,h to sho·•• 
that; sou1e self Sldlicient; cc::.u.se produueci thenH a C"-<u.se that U.i3 
4?. 
of the bod.;y. 
.) nat is st il:::. . ! mor0 iL1y>Ol'"t&nt ic the n&tu.re of tt.LC proof lt-
B:r a :,letaph;vsicL;l pr'oof, we should unue:;;.;to.nd t:J.e CO.ilviction 
vvhic h ar· ises L:.•or._:. ev iu.cnce founded on tr.LC w1changea ble natures 
of things. :..-es, om proof is a meta.ph;lsical one. l.'hc reason 
for th:'u:J is the fact that ~hrot:.,~)lout the investi~;ation we nev-:;r 
once 'i'ent outside the lL1its of the soul. All our analyseG were 
mads <ll)On 0he soul :::tlonc. -':..nd. we finally ::iscoveroJ that there 
are two sssent ial elements derJ.anded by the very na t"t;..l'e of a so-u.l 
as it exists in .m.an: a"Jsoluto frr·euom fr·on bodily ir..i.fluence irl 
life and :::JJ:;erat ion c.:..H~, an innc.L·uc desire for per·fect happiness. 
~-efle ct i ve exper i r;;n.c e gave us bo".:; h ·_these conc.i us ions; bo tn of 
then arc eq.ua lly Jr·a·.Jn from our· imrnedic1. te co.nsc ivusness. Both 
":aust, ther·efore, be c:.~ually inv,Jj_ved in any IJOSsible deductions 
on the soul. fhe two together form, as it wer9, a definition of 
the soul from whicn eve i'Y .::·ea_::wnec1 infc ~· E.nce shucld. fj_ 0'1.' -
a!lton""; vv:1ich L3 the in{0renoe of out thesis, l.ihat the s·Lirit of 
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